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In recent years, states have looked to reforms in advanced practice nursing scope of practice (SOP) barriers as a potential means
to increase access to primary care while reducing costs. Currently, 16 states and the District of Columbia permit advanced practice
registered nurses to practice independently of physicians, allowing them to perform functions such as diagnosing and prescribing
under their own authority within the primary care setting. Given the resistance of many physician associations to these reforms,
we asked whether the economic interests of primary care physicians might be aﬀected by reforms. Using the Bureau of Labor
Statistics data on earnings, we compared primary care physicians’ earnings in states that have instituted SOP reforms to those that
maintain these practice barriers. We also compared surgeons’ earnings as a control group. Lastly, we compared the rate of growth
in the earnings of primary care physicians and surgeons over the last ten years. This preliminary analysis revealed no evidence of
diﬀerences in earnings across the two groups of states.
1.Background
In its 2010 report, “The future of nursing: leading change,
advancinghealth,”theInstituteofMedicinerecommendsthe
removal of scope of practice (SOP) barriers for advanced
practice registered nurses (APRNs) such that they can “prac-
tice to the full extent of their education and training” (IOM,
S-4). Currently, only 16 states and the District of Columbia
(DC) allow APRNs to practice independently of physicians
(For this study, we employ the standards of independent
practice established by the Robert Wood Johnson Founda-
tion Center to Champion Nursing in America [1], adapted
from data collected for the annual Pearson Report [2]. By
this standard, to be considered independent within a given
state, APRNs must be permitted to diagnose and treat with-
outphysiciansupervisionandmustbepermittedtoprescribe
medications either without physician supervision or with
the signing of a one-time collaboration agreement with a
physician or the state board of nursing (this may be for all
prescribing or, in some states, only for prescribing of con-
trolled substances, among which certain drugs may require
case-speciﬁc consultations with a physician). In this way,
our inclusion criteria for independent practice capture only
states that grant APRNs complete or near-complete practice
autonomy). In response to the IOM recommendation, the
American Medical Association and the American Academy
of Family Physicians, among others, have expressed their
opposition, pointing out that physicians have more extensive
education and arguing that nurses are not substitutable
with primary care physicians [3, 4]. While the question of
whetherthereareeconomicintereststhatmightbenegatively
impacted by reforms is rarely discussed openly, the perceived
impact of reform, particularly on primary care physicians,
undoubtedly has and will continue to play a role in whether
and to what extent SOP laws are reformed [5].
To the extent that there is a fear that physician income
could decline as a result of expanding advanced practice
nursing SOP, the assumption would be that there is a zero
sum situation with regard to supply and demand in primary
care and that, because APRNs are paid less for their services,
payers will seek to substitute nurses in physician roles when-
ever possible, leading to reduced physician earnings and
inﬂuence. Such assumptions do not account for unmet need,
nor do they account for patient preferences, which may2 Nursing Research and Practice
prioritize physician services when they are accessible, and
sometimes even when care by a nurse is oﬀered at a reduced
cost and/or wait time [6].
There is, of course, a theoretical basis for believing that
APRN services will increase competition and thus help con-
tain costs. As an example of the eﬀect, this idea has on policy,
the Texas Legislative Budget Board has recently recom-
mended the removal of the state’s SOP barriers as a means
of mitigating the state’s substantial primary care shortage,
as well as reducing costs to patients [7]. In their comments
on two separate bills currently before the Texas State Senate
designedtoremoveSOPbarriersforAPRNs,theU.S.Federal
Trade Commission has expressed their support, emphasizing
that the resulting increase in competition would serve the
interests of health care consumers, and adding that their
interpretation of the evidence suggests that that it would not
adversely impact quality of care [8].
Containing costs through competition among providers
is a complex proposition that we do not intend to address in
this analysis. As a ﬁrst attempt to explore whether earnings
of employed primary care physicians in states with reforms
could be negatively impacted, we compare their earnings
to states that have not reformed their SOP laws. We also
compare the wages of surgeons, a group unlikely to be im-
pacted by expanded practices of APRNs, as a way to account
for the myriad confounding factors that could aﬀect wages
acrossstates.Finally,wecomparetheannualrateofchangein
wages over ten years (1999 to 2009) for all three practitioner
groups to determine whether physician wages rise faster in
states that retain SOP barriers.
2.PreviousResearch
Identifying empirical data to support or refute the presumed
economic concerns of physicians is a complex task, both
becausethedataislimitedandbecauseofthemethodological
challenge of attributing causality. In a literature review, only
two studies focusing on the eﬀect of SOP reforms on physi-
cian and nurse income were identiﬁed [9, 10]. Dueker et al.
used information from the current population survey (CPS)
from 1988 to 2002 for earnings data for APRNs, physician
assistants (PAs), and physicians (MDs). The authors then
constructed a binary “professional independence” variable
based on annual rankings published in Nurse Practitioner
and performed a regression analysis using this and the
wage data. Perry employed a similar methodology, but using
diﬀerentdatasources.Fordataonnursepractitioner(“NP,”a
subset of APRNs) wages, he used the national sample survey
of registered nurses (NSSRN), for Pas, he used the American
Academy of Physician Assistants Annual Census (AAPAAC),
and for MDs, he used the CPS. Perry used two binary
variables to divide the regulatory landscape—prescriptive
autonomy and reimbursement autonomy—and constructed
two additional variables to measure the eﬀect of time since
reform on wages (on the assumption that changes in the
labor market due to regulatory change build over time).
The two studies had varied results. Dueker et al. found
that higher levels of professional autonomy were associated
with a reduction in earnings of APRNs of 21% and an
increase in PA earnings of 36%, with no statistically signif-
icant eﬀect on the earnings of MDs. The authors propose
three potential models of causation to explain this eﬀect.
(1) An increase in the supply of APRNs led to lower
wages and greater practice autonomy through in-
creased political inﬂuence of APRNs.
(2) Regulatory changes attracted a greater number of
APRNstothestate,causingwagestodropinresponse
to increased supply.
(3) There was a substitution eﬀect wherein regulatory
changes led to physicians hiring fewer APRNs and a
greater number of PAs (who must work under physi-
cian supervision) for fear that their employing hos-
pital or HMO would then shift some physician func-
tions to APRNs.
While the available data did not allow the researchers to
test these hypotheses directly, the lack of a signiﬁcant corre-
lation between changes in regulation and changes in wages
leads the authors to suggest that the third explanation—that
changes in physician hiring practices led to lower APRN and
higher PA wages—is the most likely causal pathway.
In the second study, Perry found greater NP prescriptive
autonomy to be associated with an increase in NP earnings
by an average of 1.6% per year (for each year after authority
was granted) and a decrease in PA and MD earnings of
1.4% and 7.6% per year, respectively. Greater NP payment
authority was associated with a decrease in PA earnings
of 0.3% per year, with no change in NP or MD earnings.
Greater PA prescriptive authority was associated with a
decrease in NP earnings of 0.8% per year, an increase in
MD earnings of 8% per year, and no change in PA earnings.
No signiﬁcant relationship was observed between greater PA
payment authority and earnings for any of the three groups.
In the case of NP prescriptive autonomy, Perry suggests that
the observed rise in NP wages and fall in MD and PA wages
could be a result of the type of practitioner substitution
described above, wherein an increase in the number of
NPs providing primary care leads to lower MD market
share, and thus lower wages. Interpreting the results on
reimbursement autonomy, Perry suggests that, to the extent
thatNPsseekgreaterprofessionalindependence,demandfor
PAs rises to meet the demand for nonphysician caregivers
within physician-led practices. This coupling between PA
and MD earnings is also used to explain the observation that
greater PA prescriptive autonomy is associated with greater
MD earnings. Speciﬁcally, Perry suggests that the eﬃciency
gained from allowing PAs greater autonomy beneﬁt the
practice in which PAs are employed, allowing those practices
to employ fewer physicians, leading to lower operating costs.
At the same time, reduced physician-led practice costs and
increased PA practice autonomy lead to reduced demand for
NPs, exerting downward pressure on NP earnings.
While only two studies looking at the direct impact of
SOP laws on practitioner income were found, three addi-
tional studies were found that support the hypothesis that
SOP reforms are associated with a greater supply of nurses
in a state [11–13]. Sekscenski et al. looked at the supply ofNursing Research and Practice 3
PAs, NPs, and certiﬁed nurse midwives (CNMs) and found
a positive correlation between less restrictive nurse prac-
tice environments and nurse supply, in practitioners per
capita. Two subsequent studies [12, 13] observed a similar
correlation between supply of CNMs and less restrictive SOP
laws.
Aﬁ n a ls t u d yf o u n di np a p e r[ 14], an unpublished grad-
uate thesis, looked at the growth in the concentration of NPs
using county-level data across all states from 2001 to 2005
(withoutregardtolocalSOPlaws).Usinginsurancepayment
data collected by the Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality, the author performed regression analyses to inves-
tigate the relationship between growth in NP concentration
and the probability of being seen by a primary care MD (i.e.,
a family practitioner or pediatrician) when seeking primary
care and the relationship between growth in NP concentra-
tion and earnings for both NPs and MDs. In counties under-
going high growth in NP concentration (deﬁned as those
within the top 25th percentile of NP growth over the study
period), the author found that patients had 16.5% lower
odds of seeing a family practitioner or pediatrician than in
counties with lower NP growth. The author also found that
high NP growth areas were associated with reimbursement
rates 4.42% higher for NPs and 3.1% lower for primary care
MDs. Both eﬀects were statistically signiﬁcant. The author
concludes that higher NP concentrations do exert downward
pressure on primary care MD wages via the substitution
eﬀect described above, but with the qualiﬁcation that the
relatively small number of NP observations available for
analysis (some 1.59% of patient visits) and the relatively
small magnitude of the impact on MD wages preclude this
eﬀect as being a driving force behind the recent shift away
from primary and towards specialty care.
3.Methodology
In order to explore whether a simple association exists be-
tween primary care physician wages and expanded APRN
SOP laws at the state level, we used 2009 annual wage data
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) Occupational Em-
ployment Statistics Query System to compare three types of
physician practitioners across states with and without ex-
panded scope of practice laws [15].
It is important to note that BLS data includes only “em-
ployed” physicians, who under BLS deﬁnitions were approx-
imately 70% of all practicing physicians in 2001 and 88% in
2008 [16, 17]. The percentage of self-employed physicians
has been declining at a rate of approximately 2% per year
for at least the past 25 years [17]( D i ﬀerent survey method-
ologiesgivediﬀerentresultswithregardtophysicianemploy-
ment. The CPS counts a physician as employed if he or she
works any number of hours per week and thus includes a
large number of physicians working in academic and admin-
istrative capacities. Surveys by other organizations (e.g., the
CenterforStudyingHealthSystemChangeandtheAmerican
Medical Association) exclude respondents working under a
set number of hours or within particular specialties. Thus,
the proportion of self-employed physicians given by the CPS
Table 1 :Y e a ro fs c o p eo fp r a c t i c er e f o r m .
Alaska Prior to 1989
Arizona Prior to 1989
Idaho Prior to 1989
Oregon Prior to 1989
Utah Prior to 1989
Washington Prior to 1989
DC 1991
Montana 1991
Rhode Island 1991
Iowa 1992
New Hampshire 1992
Wyoming 1992
Maine 1993
New Mexico 1993
Colorado∗ 2009
Hawaii∗ 2009
Maryland∗ 2010
∗Not included in analysis.
is the lowest reported, as it includes the greatest number of
employed physicians.)
In this analysis, we compare the earnings of primary care
physicians (family and general practice physicians and gen-
eral pediatricians) to the earnings of surgeons. We assume
that because primary care physicians’ practice overlaps with
thatofAPRNs,inparticularnursepractitioners,whereassur-
geons’practicesdonot,anyeﬀectonearningsfromincreased
nursing autonomy would appear among the former two
groups without eﬀecting surgeons’ incomes. It is important
to note that while a small number of APRNs may be certiﬁed
asﬁrstassistantsinsurgery,thisisnotanareaofindependent
APRN practice and, as such, would not be aﬀected by varia-
tions in SOP laws.
There are indeed likely to be a variety of factors that dif-
fer between states that have implemented SOP reforms
and those that have not. By using a comparison group within
the profession and within the same state, however, we are
able to account for a wide range of factors that might aﬀect
both practitioner groups, such as cost of living, insurance
coverage rates in the state, physician density, and percent of
population residing in rural areas.
For the comparison of states, we selected 14 of the 17
states (including DC) that instituted full SOP reform prior
to the collection of the 2009 data and compared them to the
remaining states. Of the 14 states considered, six had reforms
prior to 1989, three in 1991, three in 1992, and two in 1993
(Table 1).
The average earnings of all three practitioner types in
thesestateswerecomparedtotheremainingstatesthatretain
SOP barriers. We asked whether in states where nurses can
practice independently of physicians, wages for family and
general pediatrician physicians would be reduced relative to
thoseofsurgeons,asthelattercategorywouldnotexperience
increased competition from nurses. Additionally, BLS data4 Nursing Research and Practice
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Figure 1: Family and general physician earnings, 2009 (with na-
tional average and standard deviation). Source: [16].
from1999(theearliestdateforwhichwagedatawasavailable
for these speciﬁc categories of practitioners) was used to
calculatetheannualrateofchangeinwagesforallthreeprac-
titioner groups.
4.Findings
Figures 1, 2,a n d3 present our principle ﬁndings, with
average earnings and one standard deviation displayed by
specialist type for each category of states in 2009. For family
and general physicians (Figure 1), average earnings in states
without SOP barriers (full SOP) were $79.36 per hour, and
earnings in states with restrictive SOP laws were $81.15. For
general pediatricians (Figure 2), earnings in full SOP states
were $83.94 per hour, and earnings in restrictive SOP states
were $78.43 per hour. For surgeons (Figure 3), earnings
in full SOP states were $107.23 per hour, and earnings in
restrictive SOP states were $103.85. In all three practitioner
groups, average earnings in full and restrictive SOP states fell
within one standard deviation of one another, conﬁrming
that, for each group, the variation in earnings between the
two types of states is not statistically signiﬁcant.
The annual rate of change in physician earnings over
ten years is presented in Figure 4. For family and general
physicians, wages rose by 5.73% per year in full SOP states
and5.11%peryearinrestrictiveSOPstates.Forgeneralpedi-
atricians, wages rose by 5.61% per year in full SOP states and
4.34% per year in restrictive SOP states. For surgeons, wages
rose by 6.39% per year full SOP states and 5.61% per year in
restrictive SOP states. These data again reveal no statistically
signiﬁcantdiﬀerencesbetweenprimarycarephysicians(fam-
ily practice and physicians and general pediatricians), whose
practice might be in competition with NPs in states with
more liberal SOP laws, and that of surgeons, whose practice
does not overlap with that of NPs.
5. Discussion
Our ﬁndings are descriptive and do not establish causality.
However,theysuggestthat,atleastamongemployedprimary
83.94
78.43
Pediatricians, full SOP
Pediatricians, restrictive SOP
$110
$100
$90
$80
$70
$60
$50
$40
D
o
l
l
a
r
s
 
p
e
r
 
h
o
u
r
Figure 2: General pediatrician earnings in states with and without
SOP barriers, 2009 (with national average and standard deviation).
Source: [16].
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Figure 3:SurgeonearningsinstateswithandwithoutSOPbarriers,
2009 (with national average and standard deviation). Source: [16].
care physicians, expanded SOP laws do not impact their
earnings. This diﬀers from the ﬁndings of Dueker et al. and
Perry, both of whom observed eﬀects on both nurse and
physician wages following the removal of SOP laws. These
eﬀects, however, could not be demonstrated to be a direct
result of changes in SOP laws, and both the magnitude and
direction of the eﬀect were diﬀerent between the two studies.
In contrast, our analysis found no signiﬁcant association
between earnings in either direction for the physician groups
compared.
The rate of change calculations yielded did not reveal
diﬀerences either. In fact, wages for all three practitioner
groups rose at a slightly faster rate between 1999 and 2009
in states with more liberal SOP laws in states with restrictive
laws. Where competition from NPs directly aﬀecting the
wages of MD via a substitution eﬀect, one would expect to
see the reverse—a slower rate of wage growth in states where
nurses are allowed to compete for primary care dollars.
This preliminary analysis suggests that MD wages are
not aﬀected by changes in SOP barriers and/or that the
removal of SOP barriers has a more nuanced eﬀect on MD
wages than simple economic substitution. For example, it isNursing Research and Practice 5
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Figure 4: Average annual percent change in physician wages, 1999–
2009. Source: [16].
possible that, as APRNs assume a more independent role in
primary care, other primary care providers begin to take on
more complex and thus more costly cases. However, the fact
that the same trends in wage growth were observed among
surgeons as well as primary care physicians also suggests that
they were due to factors unrelated to diﬀerences in SOP laws,
as surgeon wages are unlikely to be aﬀected by SOP laws.
This analysis relied on a comparison of wage data at just
two points in time and did not control for other factors (e.g.,
NP supply changes, physician density, rates of insurance cov-
erage,andlocaleconomicconditions).Itisthereforepossible
that the true correlation between SOP laws and practitioner
earnings was masked by confounders. In addition, it only
provides data on employed physicians and excludes self-
employed physicians. It also includes a number of employed
physicians who work in research and academic settings,
whose practice would not be “substitutable” with NPs.
To build upon this study, future work should identify
and control for known confounders, employ additional years
of data to further explore possible relationships between
APRNSOPreformandpractitionerwages,andemploymore
granular data sets to determine whether wages vary based on
physician and practice characteristics.
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